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Previous research indicates a lack of clear international guidelines on the permissibility of 
embryonic stem cell research and human reproductive cloning. These studies suggest that 
this is the result of severe criticism from uninformed publics, whose arguments are based 
on misconceptions influenced by popular literature and science fiction films. However, the 
current research argues that public cloning attitudes that are based on real social and ethical 
concerns should be deployed to direct social and legal policy-making on human reproductive 
cloning. Addressing public concerns about human reproductive cloning is essential in 
exploring sound avenues for sensible biotechnology and policy-making. The research, on 
which this article reported, intended to give a critical evaluation of some major arguments for 
and against human reproductive cloning in order to establish whether or not these arguments 
hold up well under rational interrogation. Notwithstanding the author’s critical attitude 
to uninformed opinions, false assumptions and unsound conclusions about the complex 
issue of human reproductive cloning, the author argued from the perspective that every life 
phenomenon is inextricably intertwined with everything else, and part of larger complex 
webs of interactions. Such a perspective recognised that the well-being of other human beings, 
including future human clones, is not only an existential, social and moral imperative but 
also epistemological. Against the backdrop of this perspective, critical questions arose that 
justified the creation of human clones in the face of possible defects and abnormalities in 
cloned children, as well as the possible harm to societies. 
© 2012. The Authors.
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Introduction
The cloning of humans and the biotechnology of embryonic stem cell research will inevitably 
change our views of human life and the procreation of humans. Without ethical reflection on 
scientific and technological advances associated with human life and well-being, societies might 
find themselves in a bio-technocratic state that disregards the welfare of future cloned children, 
and encourages degraded views of humans as merely a means to medical advances, as depicted 
in Ishiguro’s Never let me go (2005).
Ever since the cloning of Dolly, a sheep, in 1997, there has been ongoing debate about the 
impact of the technology of somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) and the possibility of human 
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Menslike voortplantingskloning en biotegnologie: Rasionele, etiese en publieke besorgdhede. 
Vroeëre navorsing oor kloning wys op ’n afwesigheid van duidelike internasionale riglyne oor 
die aanvaarbaarheid van embrioniese stamsel-navorsing en menslike voortplantingskloning. 
Hierdie studies wys daarop dat dit te wyte is aan erge kritiek van die oningeligte publiek, wie 
se argumente gebaseer is op wanopvattings wat beïnvloed word deur populêre literatuur en 
wetenskapsfiksie-films. In hierdie artikel word daar egter aangevoer dat die publiek se houding, 
indien dit in werklike sosiale en etiese oorwegings gefundeer is, in ag geneem moet word om 
rigting te gee aan sosiale en wetlike besluitneming oor menslike voortplantingskloning. Die 
inagneming van openbare kommer oor menslike voortplantingskloning is essensieel in die 
soeke na rasionele en wyse beleidsbepaling en biotegnologiese oorwegings. Die navorsing 
waaroor hierdie artikel verslag lewer, poog om ’n kritiese evaluering van sommige dominante 
argumente vir en teen menslike voortplantingskloning te gee in die lig van rasionele oorweging. 
Nieteenstaande die outeur se kritiese benadering tot oninligte opinies, vals aannames en 
ongegronde gevolgtrekkings oor die komplekse kwessie van menslike voortplantingskloning, 
argumenteer die outeur vanuit die perspektief dat elke lewensverskynsel onontkombaar 
verbonde is en deel vorm van ’n groter komplekse netwerk van interaksies. Hierdie perspektief 
erken dat die welsyn van ander mense, insluitende toekomstige menslike klone, nie slegs ’n 
eksistensiële, sosiale en etiese kwessie is nie, maar ook ’n epistemologiese imperatief. Teen die 
agtergrond van hierdie perspektief, opper die outeur kritiese vrae oor die regverdiging van 
die skepping van toekomstige menslike klone te midde van die moontlikheid van defekte en 
abnormaliteite in gekloonde kinders, asook moontlike sosiale skade. 
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cloning. The possibility of cloning human beings in the 
future challenges our views on human life, biotechnology 
control, personal identity, human dignity, parenthood, 
family relations, reproductive liberty and the status of 
embryos. The meanings of these concepts are complex, often 
vague and depend on people’s current cultural and religious 
worldviews. The biotechnology of cloning and its possible 
application to humans also elicits many complex questions 
that are difficult to answer:
• how far will humanity go in using technology to (re)
produce human life? 
• which ethical dilemmas does human cloning present? 
• does the sacrifice of pre-embryos justify the need for 
medical treatment and producing transplant tissues? 
The overarching question that arises from all this complexity 
is: how do we, as philosophers, social scientists, bioethicists 
and theologians, make a contribution to provide some 
answers to the permissibility of human cloning in order to 
inform the public and to direct policy-making?
A systematic review of academic literature in the field of 
human reproductive cloning reveals that there are differing 
and conflicting views on human cloning, ranging from 
conservative to liberal perspectives. The literature emphasises 
that these debates include speculations about the effects 
of cloning on human life as we know it and the creation of 
humans (Davis 2009; Evans 2002; Harris 2004; Macintosch 
2005; MacKinnon 2000; Pence 1998a; Strong 2005a; West 
2003). These works suggest that most arguments on human 
cloning are, to a large extent, built on misconceptions and 
false assumptions, influenced by popular literature and 
science fiction films, about the technology of cloning and its 
potential application to human beings.
Further scrutiny of human cloning literature reveals the 
absence of clear international guidelines on the justifiability 
of embryonic stem cell research and human cloning. Some 
authors claim that the lack of clarity on the permissibility 
of human cloning, and consequently the absence of clear 
international legislation, is the result of severe criticism from 
the public. This is because they are misinformed as their 
opinions are influenced by popular publications, the media, 
science fiction literature and films that portray the technology 
of cloning as an evil process manipulated by irresponsible 
scientists (Dawkins 1998; Green 2001; Harris 2004; Kitcher 
2000; Macintosch 2005; Pence 1998a).
On the other hand, the argument in this article maintains that 
attitudes to cloning, that are based on real social and moral 
concerns, should be taken into consideration, to direct social 
and legal policy-making on human reproductive cloning and 
human embryonic research. In reaction to public sentiments 
and misconceptions, some advocates of human embryonic 
stem cell research (Harris 2004; Macintosch 2005; Pence 
1998a & 1998b) do not take public opinion seriously. As a 
result, the deeper social and ethical values on which publics 
frequently base their opinions are ignored. The question is 
whether or not these advocates engage seriously in critical 
reflection about the difficult task of determining where and 
how thinking about cloning goes wrong. The debate, thus, 
does not reach conclusive answers about the justifiability of 
cloning and human clones.
Responding to this dilemma, the research on which this 
article reports seeks to give a critical evaluation of some major 
arguments for and against human reproductive cloning, 
in order to establish whether or not these arguments hold 
up well under rational interrogation. The method applied 
in this article is an open system of critical examination of 
uninformed opinions, false assumptions and unsound 
conclusions, with the aim to think through the complex issue 
of human reproductive cloning. On this premise, the author 
adopts a philosophical approach that is based on the Socratic 
principle of critical reflection and examination of problems 
before conclusions are drawn.
Notwithstanding my critical attitude towards unsubstantiated 
arguments on the complex issue of human reproductive 
cloning, I follow an enactivist non-linear worldview, developed 
by Maturana and Varela (1987) and Varela, Thompson 
and Rosch (1991). According to this understanding, and in 
contrast to atomistic worldviews, such as objectivism and 
idealism, every life phenomenon is seen as inextricably 
intertwined with everything else and forms part of larger 
complex webs of interaction. Such a perspective recognises 
that as human beings we are bound by our common 
humanity, and that the well-being of other human beings, 
including future human clones, is not only an existential, 
social and moral imperative, but also an epistemological 
imperative. Consequently, I contend that, in the context of 
humanity itself as a species, which is intricately part of larger 
complex webs of interactions, there are some basic moral 
principles that measure up to critical interrogation.
Against the backdrop of this perspective, critical questions 
arise about justifying the creation of human clones in the face 
of harm to cloned children and harm to societies at large. 
This article intends to make a contribution in clearing away 
false assumptions, factual and prejudiced confusions, in 
order to assist in informing the public as well as policy-
makers about the possible implications of the permissibility 
of cloning and its application to humans.
The following section deals with the technology of cloning 
and the concerns about its application to humans.
The technology of cloning and its 
concerns
To avoid misconceptions about cloning, its potential 
application to human beings and consequently its moral 
and political considerations, it is crucial to understand what 
cloning is. Definitions can, at worst, be deliberately politically 
and emotionally misleading, and persuasive at best.
When it comes to deliberations about human reproductive 
cloning, one should take care to define the concept of cloning 
as accurately as possible. Seidel (2000:17–32) points out that 
there are several definitions of ‘clone’. The concept ‘clone’ 
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is derived from the Greek word klon, meaning ‘twig’. The 
meaning of the word ‘clone’, in this sense, refers to the 
process of breaking a twig off from certain species of tree 
or plant and, when planted, a copy of the tree or plant will 
result. Another definition of ‘clone’ is to make a genetic 
copy or set of copies of an organism, that is, bisecting a 
mammalian embryo to form identical twins (Seidel 2000:17). 
This type of cloning (embryo splitting) involves a fertilised 
egg and is, thus, a version of sexual reproduction. Cloning 
can also be defined as ‘fusion or insertion of a diploid nucleus 
into an egg (oocyte)’ (Seidel 2000:17). This method is known 
as somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) and refers to asexual 
reproduction because no fertilisation is involved. This was 
the cloning technology Wilmut and his colleagues at the 
Roslin Institute in Edinburgh used in order to clone Dolly 
(Wilmut et al. 1997).
For the purpose of the research being reported here, the 
following definition will apply to cloning with reference 
to human cloning: Human cloning is human asexual 
reproduction achieved by way of the SCNT technique to 
produce a living human organism (at any stage of biological 
development) that is genetically identical to a human donor.
Human cloning, according to the above definition, thus 
entails a procedure of taking a cell nucleus from an adult 
donor (female or male) to be cloned and then, using an 
electric current, fusing it with an empty egg cell taken from 
a female subject. A blastocyst starts to develop and divides 
into many cells (Potton 1997; Thomson et al. 1998; Wilmut 
et al. 1997).
In theory, SCNT could be applied for human reproductive 
purposes. Jaenisch and Wilmut (2001:2552) state that it is 
possible to clone humans, but ‘attempts to clone human 
beings at a time when the scientific issues of nuclear cloning 
have not been clarified are dangerous and irresponsible’. In 
this case, a viable embryo created through SCNT technology 
would be implanted into a viable womb, and under the 
right conditions, it is possible that a child, who is genetically 
related to the DNA source, would be born as a result.
Since the cloning of Dolly, the technology of human 
embryonic stem cell research and cloning techniques has 
advanced rapidly. This has led to a shift in the way scientists, 
philosophers, theologians, ethicists and policy-makers think 
about human cloning and its implications. There is awareness 
in scientific communities that human reproductive cloning is 
no longer just a probability but that the cloning of humans 
is inevitable (Davis 2009; Savulescu & Bostrom 2009; Stock 
2003). Scientists and the medical community are optimistic 
that sooner or later the creation of human clones will be a 
reality.
If this view is correct, we need policies and standards of 
behaviour in place to deal with the challenges presented by 
the technique of reproductive cloning. These policies and 
standards of behaviour should include the following:
• regulations on the harvesting of stem cells from human 
embryos for medical purposes
• health risks and abnormalities to human clones resulting 
from inappropriate epigenetic reprogramming
• the care of and respect for people created by reproductive 
cloning, should this become a reality in future.
Policy-making on SCNT and human reproductive cloning 
should be founded on some basic principles after due 
consideration to the ethical and social implications of human 
cloning. However, as will be illustrated in the sections to 
follow, no consensus exists on the possible social and ethical 
implications of reproductive cloning. Thus, in the absence 
of consensus, clear social policy on human cloning would 
remain on the borderline of indecision, as is currently the 
case in the United States of America (USA) and the European 
Union (EU) countries. Except for the United Kingdom (UK), 
who adopted a liberal position, EU countries have adopted no 
legislation, but have banned human cloning and the creation 
of human embryos for research purposes. On 22 January 
2001, the UK adopted a liberal position and became the first 
country to approve human embryonic stem cell research. The 
USA followed the EU and adopted no clear social policy, but 
ten states have passed laws restricting research on human 
embryos, foetuses and unborn children (Harris 2004:122).
Considering the above legal advances, there is a need 
for critical reflections on debates about the act of human 
cloning in an attempt to direct policy-making. Consequently, 
the significance of critical examination of the underlying 
assumptions and prejudices in arguments on human cloning 
cannot be underestimated.
In the sections to follow, I give a critical exploration of some 
major arguments for and against human cloning. These have 
the aim of determining whether or not they uphold the test 
of rational, social and ethical deliberation about justifying the 
creation of human clones in the face of possible defects and 
abnormalities in cloned children as well as possible harm to 
families and societies.
Arguments against human 
reproductive cloning
The view, that reproductive human cloning is wrong, can be 
divided into two broad categories:
• arguments based on harm to the cloned child
• arguments based on harm to societies.
Broadly speaking, the arguments in the first category entail 
concerns about the uniqueness and identity of the cloned 
person, and the argument about safety, that concern the 
potential health risk to cloned children. Arguments from the 
second group involve concerns about class, gender and race 
injustices, the meaning of procreation, parenthood and that 
effects on family relations as well as concerns about harm to 
societies. 
Arguments based on harm to the cloned child
The argument about harm to cloned children entails that 
human reproductive cloning is wrong because the uniqueness 
and identity of cloned persons are at stake.
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The argument concerning uniqueness and identity
Some opponents of human cloning have claimed that human 
cloning is wrong because it jeopardises the cloned person’s 
uniqueness and identity. Shortly after the cloning of Dolly, 
Rifkin (in Kluger 1997) stated:
It’s a horrendous crime to make a Xerox of someone ... For 
the first time, we’ve taken the principles of industrial design – 
quality control, predictability – and applied them to a human 
being. (p. 70)
Some other authors (Annas 1998; Baird 1999; Holm 1998; 
Kass 1997, 2002; McKibben 2003; Williamson 1999) express 
similar concerns by referring to human cloning as ‘life in the 
shadow’, ‘disregard of the right to a unique genetic make-
up’, ‘diminishing of the clone’s sense of uniqueness’ and the 
challenge of ‘staying human in an engineered age’.
Some of these objections are based on the belief that cloning 
involves the creation of an identical copy of the original DNA 
donor and, therefore, the cloned person would not be a unique 
person. This perception may come from representations of 
human cloning in science fiction films, popular literature, 
newspapers, and sensationalist journalists. For instance, 
on the front pages of many magazines that introduced the 
world to Dolly and communicated the technology of human 
cloning, two identical copies of babies were portrayed. What 
many people read into this is that human cloning is the act of 
making an identical copy of the original person. Although a 
human clone may have the same nuclear genes as the donor, 
it is not correct to think that he or she would be an exact 
replica of the adult donor.
In reply to the concern about uniqueness and identity of 
clones, Lewontin (2000) and Strong (2005a) maintain that this 
concern rests on the fallacy of biological determinism, which 
is based on the supposition that organisms are completely 
determined by their genes. They argue that the cloned person 
is identical to its donor in its genetic constitution, but not in the 
phenotype, that is, in the molecular structure, the formation 
of the brain, and everything that comes from the physical, 
socio-political and cultural environment that constitutes the 
uniqueness and identity of an individual. Lewontin (2000:37) 
maintains that the question of uniqueness and identity entails 
a misunderstanding of developmental biology, where ‘gene’ 
is substituted for ‘person’.
In addition, researchers on monozygotic twins (Bouchard 
1997; Eley, Gregory, Clark & Ehlers 2007) maintain that, even 
when there are IQ or mental disorder similarities in twins, 
their behaviours, cognitive abilities and personalities are not 
the same, and they differ according to individual experiences. 
On this point, some authors (Johnson 1997; Pence 1998b; 
Strong 2005b) emphasise that the experiences of a person 
cannot be replicated by cloning.
To a certain extent, the above arguments succeed in pointing 
out errors in reasoning concerning genetic determinism and 
its extrapolation to psychological and social consequences. 
However, is pointing out the errors in reasoning sufficient 
to argue against the fact that the identity of the clone may 
be violated, based on the fact that the genome of the cloned 
child is known (determined) in the sense that another person 
(known person) has the same genome?
Whilst I agree that a clone would not be an identical copy of the 
original donor, that organisms are not completely determined 
by their genes and that the experiences of a person cannot be 
replicated by cloning, I concur with Fukuyama (2002), Holm 
(1998) and McKibben (2003) that the identity of the clone may 
be violated. This is based on the fact that cloning produces 
a human being with a known genome, ‘determined’ by 
those who are involved in the cloning of this human being, 
and who have certain hopes and expectations about the 
characteristics of that person. If we adopt the view that the 
indeterminedness of the genome is a biological substrate for 
the equality and reciprocal freedom of human beings, then 
cloning human beings, whose genomes are determined, calls 
into question the philosophical and ontological problem of 
uniqueness and identity.
Considering the arguments for and against human cloning, 
in the light of concerns about the uniqueness and identity of 
clones, it can be concluded that there is a rational, ontological 
and moral basis to claims that cloning humans could 
compromise the uniqueness and identity of clones.
The argument based on safety
Another argument against human cloning is the argument 
based on safety. This reasoning claims that the technology 
of cloning has not been proved to be safe and the potential 
risk of harm to the cloned child is too high to justify human 
cloning (Dawkins 1998; Jaenisch & Wilmut 2001; Kitcher 
2000; Murray 2001; NAS 2002; NBAC 1997). Both the 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) of 1997 
and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) of 2002 in the 
USA, called for a prohibition of the creation of an actual 
human being through the procedure of SCNT, based on 
safety considerations.
There are good grounds for the argument against human 
cloning based on safety concerns. To date we do not have 
sufficient scientific and medical evidence that cloned persons 
would not suffer from deformities and abnormalities as a 
result of errors in epigenetic reprogramming. The argument 
based on safety is both a practical and ethical concern, because 
creating humans in the face of health risks and abnormalities 
would be unethical. The creation of human clones with 
defects and abnormalities flies in the face of concern for their 
well-being, future generations and humanity as a species. 
These all form part of multidimensional webs of co-existence.
To my mind, the argument based on safety is justifiable. Even 
if it could be claimed that every new technology is imperfect 
(Pollack 1993) and that no reproductive technology can 
guarantee a child’s exemption from defects (Pence 1998a), 
SCNT technology remains to be proved safe for humans. A 
deeper discussion on the argument based on safety follows 
later in this article.
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Whilst some opponents of human cloning argue that it 
would harm the cloned child, other opponents argue that it 
would harm society at large (Cole-Turner 2001; Fukuyama 
2002; McKibben 2003).
Arguments based on harm to society
Arguments based on harm to society entail concerns 
about class, gender and race injustices, and the meaning of 
procreation, parenthood and the effects on family relations.
Concerns about class, race and gender injustices
Some opponents of human cloning (Cole-Turner 2001; 
Fukuyama 2002; McKibben 2003) associate it with genetic 
engineering. The concern here is that the scientific knowledge 
of somatic cell nuclear transfer could be abused to produce 
children of certain chosen class, race or gender types. This, 
they argue, could lead to social injustices, such as class, 
race and gender discrimination and, thus, harm societies 
at large. In an attempt to counter-argue the concern about 
race, class and gender injustices, Macintosch (2005:40) opines 
that ‘a genome that contributed toward the development 
of a person with particular traits and characteristics could 
never produce the same individual.’ However, to my mind, 
Macintosch’s argument does not address the issue at hand. 
Although there is no one-to-one relation between genes and 
individuality, cloning can result in race, gender and class 
injustices. For instance, cloning from a White intelligent 
male will result in clones that are White, male and probably 
intelligent. Moreover, if cloning is combined with a selection 
of clones who are from a genetic pool of White intelligent 
males, irrespective of their individual traits and personalities, 
clones will result in race, class and gender injustices.
Another argument against the concern about race, class 
and gender injustices comes from Silver (1998:171), who 
maintains that even if the rich and racially obsessed could 
afford to bear children by cloning, it would have a negligible 
impact on race, class and gender stratification. To my mind, 
Silver argues from an economical point of view, whereas the 
argument from race, class and gender injustices pertains to 
social and ethical concerns. In response to Silver’s view point, 
one could ask: What if the technology of human reproductive 
cloning becomes efficient, legal, and popular amongst all the 
moneyed classes? In this case Silver’s argument would fail.
Considering the above arguments for and against human 
cloning and concerns about class, race and gender injustices, 
it can be concluded that there are sufficient grounds (rational, 
social and moral) to claim that cloning could compromise 
race, class and gender stratification and jeopardise equality. 
Consequently, cloning could lead to social injustices and 
harm societies at large.
The argument concerning the meaning of procreation, 
parenthood and the effects on family relations
Some opponents of human cloning (Bruce 1998; Gosden 
1999; Paris 2001) argue that there is a difference between 
‘begetting’ and ‘making’ children in terms of procreation. 
According to this view ‘begetting’ refers to the act of creating 
and conceiving children through sexual reproduction, whilst 
‘making’ refers to the production of children through a 
technique of selecting and controlling children’s genotypes, 
as in the case of human reproductive cloning (Bruce 1998). 
Moreover, Paris (2001:46) contends that human reproductive 
cloning would lead to treating cloned children as ‘mere objects 
of utility’. The underpinning assumption, in this reasoning, 
is that cloned persons would be less human (‘mere objects of 
utility’) because of the technique used to ‘produce’ children.
To my mind, the difference that is drawn between ‘begetting’ 
and ‘making’ children is obfuscated. The ‘making’ of children 
also includes the assisted reproductive technology of in vitro 
fertilisation (IVF). After many years of the existence of this 
technology, of ‘making’ children, there is no conclusive 
evidence (empirical, social or ethical) that people who use 
IVF treat their children as mere manufactured objects and, 
thereby, there is no evidence that this affects family relations 
negatively. Likewise, it could be argued that there is no 
rational ground to believe that people who use the assisted 
reproductive technique of SCNT would treat their children 
as mere objects of utility and that this, thereby, would affect 
family relations negatively.
In response to the question of the meaning of reproduction, 
parenthood and the effects on family relations, I propose 
that this issue is approached from the angle of deeper 
philosophical, social and ethical questions about the fact that 
cloned children would be human beings with determined 
(known) genomes. Considering this perspective, it is the 
‘determinedness’ of human clones that gives rise to concern. 
I discussed the issue of ‘determinedness’ earlier and will 
not further elaborate on this point here. Given the fact that 
the cloned child would have the same genome and hence a 
special link to only one parent, it follows that human cloning 
could complicate parent and family dynamics. To my mind, 
parenthood and family relations do not occur in isolation, 
but form part of larger webs of existential, emotional, social 
and cultural relations and interactions. For instance, if a clone 
is born who has the same genome as the ‘father’, how should 
the parents, family, friends, society and the law relate and 
treat the child? Is the parent (the ‘father’) who donated the 
genes the father of the child, or is he the brother of the child? 
In my opinion, these concerns are not overstated or mere 
speculations as Macintosch (2005) and Harris (2004) would 
have us believe, but real social and ethical concerns about the 
possible negative impact of human cloning on reproduction, 
parenthood and family relations.
Considering the arguments for and against human cloning 
in the light of concerns about the meaning of reproduction, 
parenthood and family relations, it can be concluded that 
there is a rational, social and moral basis to claim that 
cloning humans could compromise family relations and blur 
generational boundaries.
In summary, a critical examination of arguments offered in 
support of concerns about the effects of human cloning on 
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uniqueness and identity, class, race, gender injustices, the 
meaning of procreation, parenthood and family relations, 
has shown that these arguments do stand the test of rational 
deliberation, rather than being built upon emotional reactions 
and false understandings of human cloning.
Arguments for allowing human 
cloning
In the section to follow, I will discuss two main arguments for 
the permissibility of human reproductive cloning. The first is 
based on individual choice and reproductive liberty, and the 
second focuses on the medical benefits of cloning. The aim is 
to establish whether or not these arguments uphold the test 
of rational, social and moral concerns.
Individual choice and reproductive liberty
The argument that is based on individual choice and 
procreative liberty entails that a prohibition on asexual 
human reproduction, such as in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and 
artificial insemination, is a violation of the constitutional 
protection of procreative liberty. In almost all countries 
worldwide, the constitutional protection of procreative 
liberty states that individuals have the freedom to decide 
whether or not to have children.
It is argued that in democratic societies, the government 
cannot control people’s decisions about procreation, nor 
can it dictate how and why people should procreate, or how 
many children they should have. Furthermore, the argument 
states that there are many infertile people, gay persons and 
individuals who do not prefer sexual reproduction but who 
wish to have children, but cannot do so. Those who follow 
the logic of this argument maintain that the liberty and 
moral interests of these groups of people must be taken into 
account. Ostensibly, these liberties and moral interests are 
founded on the following premises: People choose or desire 
to have children for all kinds of reasons:
• to have a family and companionship
• to have descendants for the continuation of the family 
lineage
• as a status symbol
• to live up to societal norms and expectations
• to prove adulthood
• to attempt to save a marriage. 
Thus, it is argued, the reasons for people to want children 
are a matter of privacy and individual choice. On the basis of 
this, proponents of human reproductive cloning (Harris 2004; 
Macintosch 2005; Pence 1998a & 1998b) claim that moral and 
legal prohibition of new technologies of reproduction would 
be an unconstitutional infringement on people’s individual 
choice and procreative freedom. This is because it would 
deny them access to new methods of procreation.
I have a number of problems with this argument:
• Firstly, the argument confuses the technology of human 
cloning with the actuality of cloning humans.
• Secondly, the central issue in deliberations on human 
cloning is about cloning and not about the right to 
procreation.
• Thirdly, restrictive legislation on the technology of human 
cloning does not imply an unconstitutional violation of 
people’s reproductive liberty. The reason for this is clear: 
state control of the technique of reproduction does not 
equal annihilation of people’s freedom to procreate.
The argument based on medical benefits
The argument based on medical benefits maintains that 
cloning combined with stem cell technologies (also labelled 
‘therapeutic cloning’ by some scientists) has significant 
therapeutic value and medical benefits. These include 
enhancing the process of discovering new medicines for 
alleviating illnesses such as Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, 
Huntington’s, Lou Gehrig’s disease, heart diseases, 
lymphoma, leukaemia, diabetes, anaemia and the partial 
restoration of damaged spinal cords. Moreover, it is claimed 
that therapeutic cloning offers promising ways of supplying 
organs and tissues, such as new livers, hearts, nerve cells and 
bone barrow for transplants. However, all these proclaimed 
medical benefits are in need of empirical verification.
Because both human reproductive cloning (also known 
as baby cloning) and therapeutic cloning (also known as 
research cloning) involve stem cell cloning and are both 
by definition forms of reproduction, a distinction between 
them is important when it comes to their research effects 
and ethical considerations. The distinction I draw, between 
the two technologies, pertains to intention and source. The 
intention of human reproductive cloning is to reproduce 
humans, whereas the intention of therapeutic cloning is not 
to create babies, but to discover new drugs for the treatment 
of medical disorders. Furthermore, in the case of human 
reproductive cloning, the source from which stem cells are 
derived is from an adult human donor, for instance, these are 
extracted from the donor’s bone marrow or muscle tissue. 
The donor is not terminated in the process. In therapeutic 
cloning, stem cells are ‘mined’ from human (or animal) 
embryos which are then destroyed in the process. This state 
of affairs raises important ethical questions, similar to the 
problem of abortion. However, an analysis of the ethical 
considerations of therapeutic cloning falls outside the scope 
of this article. Here, I give an analysis of the argument 
that claims that there is nothing wrong with the cloning of 
embryos for medical benefits.
Some supporters of therapeutic cloning (Vogelstein, Alberts 
& Shine 2002; West 2003) argue that there is nothing wrong 
with the cloning of embryos for medical benefits, because at 
the blastocyst stage of development embryonic  stem cells are 
simply clumps of cells and there is a vast difference between 
a pre-embryo and an actual human being. West (2003:91) 
insists that the creation and destruction of a pre-embryo does 
not amount to the destruction of a human, because it is not 
a human being. According to West then, therapeutic cloning 
should go ahead.
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On the other hand, the question can be asked whether 
or not West (2003), in his moral and legal perspective on 
therapeutic cloning, has considered the ethical justifiability 
of creating embryos as sources for stem cells and the morality 
of experimentation on human embryos. In fact, the actuality 
of cloning has also brought about the ethical dilemma of 
creating embryos and then discarding them.
Moral debates on this issue revolve around the question of 
the biological and moral status of the embryo. This issue re-
opens the whole debate on the moral justification of abortion 
and the problem of whether or not an embryo is a human 
life. These questions have been extensively discussed by 
social scientists and philosophers (see for example Espejo 
2002; Feinberg & Feinberg 2010; Steinbock 2011; Van Niekerk 
& Van Zyl 1996). For this reason, the research reported in this 
article did not examine these issues.
It is a fact that moral issues about therapeutic cloning are 
complex and nebulous. On the one hand, scientists, medical 
doctors and healthcare workers are faced with the obligation 
to serve humanity by applying their biological and medical 
research findings and knowledge to reduce human suffering 
and alleviate medical conditions. On the other hand, the 
sacrificing of human embryos for the benefit of others 
remains an important and debatable issue.
In order to put all the relevant issues into perspective, I 
will give a synthesis of the differing and often conflicting 
arguments regarding human reproductive cloning that 
have been examined in the current research. My analysis of 
arguments against human reproductive cloning has shown 
arguments based on uniqueness and identity and those based 
on concerns about class, race and gender injustices, offered 
in support of concerns about the effects of human cloning 
on uniqueness and identity, class, race, gender injustices, the 
meaning of procreation, parenthood and family relations. 
My analysis has shown that these arguments are based on 
real social and ethical concerns, rather than on emotional 
reactions and misunderstandings of the technology of 
cloning and its application to humans.
The examination of the argument based on individual 
choice and procreative liberty has shown that restrictive 
legislation on human cloning does not necessarily violate 
reproductive liberty. I pointed out that the argument confuses 
the issue of social and ethical acceptability of human cloning 
with the professed right to procreation. To my mind, the 
argument based on procreative freedom is found wanting 
in substantiation of a rational and moral basis to support a 
liberal belief in human control in the face of safety risks to 
clones and society at large. In fact, if states can show that 
they have a rational basis for adopting restrictive legislation 
on cloning, their decision would override people’s wishes to 
procreate through the technology of cloning humans.
The discussion on the argument based on medical benefits 
revealed that therapeutic cloning brings forth complex moral 
dilemmas about the issue of sacrificing human and animal 
embryos for the benefit of others. These moral dilemmas are 
extremely difficult to resolve, given that there are differing 
and conflicting views on when human life begins.
If it is a fact that there is not adequate scientific proof that 
the cloning technology would be safe for cloning humans, 
it follows that any attempt to clone humans for the purpose 
of creating children is irresponsible and unethical, despite 
the advocates of human reproductive cloning who try to 
argue against this viewpoint (Pence 1998a; Pollack 1993; 
Macintosch 2005).
Here, I want to single out Macintosch’s view. Macintosch 
(2005:45) rejects the argument based on safety on the basis 
that ‘safety has achieved prominence as a secularised 
objection to a technology that is unpopular for religious 
and other reasons’. She claims that she does not believe that 
‘safety concerns are the primary force motivating public 
and political opposition to cloning and human clones’ 
(Macintosch 2005:44) and asks whether or not there is any 
scientific basis for upholding safety concerns.
This brings me to an issue that was raised earlier in this 
article. The point was made that attitudes to cloning, that 
are based on real social and moral concerns, should be taken 
into account to direct policy making on human reproductive 
cloning. This is the topic of the section to follow.
Social and moral concerns of the 
public
Responding to Macintosch’s insistence on a scientific basis for 
justifying the view of safety concerns (Macintosch 2005:44), 
I want to point out that the controversies and tensions 
engendered by new technologies in the field of human 
embryonic stem cell research and the belief in the inevitability 
of human reproductive cloning do not merely involve the 
possible scientific successes or failures, but also the social and 
ethical implications of its aims and successes.
In support of this reasoning, a number of authors (Bates et al. 
2005; Gaskell, Allum & Stares 2003; Morris & Adley 2001; 
Nisbet 2004; Priest 2000; Shepherd et al. 2006), who reviewed 
poll results on public opinion about stem cell research and 
human cloning in the USA, UK and EU countries, have 
pointed out that the use of statistical evidence alone is not 
enough to arrive at conclusions about public concerns. These 
authors maintain that it is necessary to go beyond quantitative 
poll results to understand public attitudes to cloning.
This argumentation gave rise to focus group studies in the USA, 
UK and European countries (Bates et al. 2005; Gaskell et al. 
2003; Morris & Adley 2001; Priest 2000; Shepherd et al. 2006) 
as a means of qualitative measurement to address public 
concerns about cloning and human clones. These authors 
attempted to show why the public is opposed to cloning. 
From their focus group studies, they (Bates et al. 2005; 
Shepherd et al. 2006) reported that the public has real social 
and ethical concerns about cloning and human clones, which 
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are not necessarily based upon misunderstandings of genetic 
technology. Results obtained from these focus group studies 
show that public concerns about cloning and human clones 
are founded on deeper underlying social and ethical values 
or beliefs, such as respect for human life (extending as far 
back as the moment of conception and taking into account 
the status of the embryo) and respect for the natural order of 
things (extending to future generations) (Bates et al. 2005:334; 
Nisbet 2004:145; Shepherd et al. 2006:11). In fact, these studies 
have shown that the issues of interference with nature, with 
reference to safety concerns and the status of the embryo, 
were the most frequently drawn-upon values or beliefs upon 
which respondents based their concerns (Bates et al. 2005:334; 
Shepherd et al. 2006:11).
In addition, research conducted by Bates (2005), which 
was based on 25 focus groups convened to explore the lay 
public’s understanding of cloning and human clones, has 
shown that the articulation of public concerns about cloning 
and human clones is far less influenced by mass media, 
popular publications, science fiction literature and films than 
advocates, scientists and policy makers make us believe. In 
his study, Bates (2005) indicates that publics draw upon their 
own personal frames of reference and moral frameworks 
to bear on their understanding of genetic science and their 
opinions on the permissibility of human reproductive 
cloning. He says that ‘too many studies assume a paradigm 
of “garbage in, garbage out”’ (Bates 2005:60). He further 
argues that people are not computers. Rather, publics process 
information about genetics and human cloning in a complex 
and critical way according to their personal and cultural 
frames of reference (Bates 2005:47; Shepherd et al. 2006).
On the basis of these studies and in consideration of 
arguments based on concerns about the safety and well-
being of future cloned children, family relations and 
society at large, the reasoning in this article maintains that 
the moral and ethical dimensions of biotechnology, that 
underlie public concerns about cloning and human clones, 
need to be taken into account to direct social and legal 
policy making on cloning and human reproductive cloning. 
Maienschein (2005) emphasises that the research findings 
and viewpoints of biologists and scientists alone are not 
enough to give us the wisdom we need to guide our political 
and social decisions about human cloning. Perhaps we could 
adopt some basic social and moral principles founded on 
social and ethical values, such as respect for human life, 
respect for the natural order of things, and consideration of 
safety concerns. However, given the fact that we live in a 
pluralistic postmodern society, where people have differing 
and conflicting views, consensus about social and moral 
principles would be a complex issue.
Accordingly, the question arises: How do we, as philosophers, 
theologians, ethicists and social scientists, make the wisest 
medical and bioscience policy we can about human cloning 
and SCNT? According to Maienschein (2005), the crucial 
issue we learn from the history of biology, science and 
morality is the following:
There have been many views of life and many ways to define 
when a life begins, just as there still are and always will be. The 
questions have changed as our science has advanced, and the 
answers have had to be renegotiated in the light of accumulating 
knowledge. Any policy answer should be grounded in the best 
available current science and the best moral thinking―and in 
the knowledge that science and morality are not intrinsically at 
odds. (p. 301)
Moreover, Du Plessis (2006:61) makes the point that wisdom 
entails knowing how to apply science and knowledge 
wisely. He points out that ‘science implies knowledge with a 
responsible conscience’. The swift advances of biotechnology 
in the field of human embryonic stem cell research give 
scientists the power to transform the world and human 
life. Some scientists have adopted the attitude that moral 
discourse from lay people and critical debates of philosophers 
and ethicists are pure speculations and theorising and 
can, therefore, be ignored in policy-making. Such science 
does not imply ‘knowledge with a responsible conscience’ 
(Du Plessis 2006:61).
Conclusion
The preceding discussion revealed that critical debates by 
philosophers, ethicists, theologians, scientists and bioethicists 
are crucial to clear away false assumptions, factual and 
prejudiced confusions about cloning and its application to 
humans. I have demonstrated that such critical discourses 
would be valuable to inform the public and policy-makers 
about the possible implications of the permissibility of 
human embryonic research and human cloning.
Implications of the findings of this research include the 
debate about the importance of the inclusion of public social 
and moral concerns in deliberation of policy-making on 
cloning and human reproductive cloning. It is in the interest 
of humanity and future generations to clarify the confusions 
surrounding the technology of cloning and its application to 
humans, in order to prevent harm to future human clones 
and to guide sensible biotechnology and associated policy-
making. The application of cloning to humans remains a 
health and moral concern because cloning needs to be tested 
on humans in order to verify its risks.
This research will contribute to an increased clarity surrounding 
the technology of cloning and possible implications of the 
permissibility of human embryonic research and the cloning 
of humans. Future research in this regard would be useful to 
open up sound avenues to explore the interrelated issues of 
well-informed opinions on human cloning, public opinion, 
sensible biotechnology and policy-making on cloning and 
human reproductive cloning.
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